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We consider a two-period model. In the first period, individuals consume two goods: one is 
sinful and the other is not. The sin good brings pleasure but has a detrimental effect on second 
period health and individuals tend to underestimate this effect. In the second period, 
individuals can devote part of their saving to improve their health status and thus compensate 
for the damage caused by their sinful consumption. We consider two alternative specifications 
concerning this second period health care decision: either individuals acknowledge that they 
have made a mistake in the first period out of myopia or ignorance, or they persist in ignoring 
the detrimental effect of their sinful consumption. We study the optimal linear taxes on sin 
good consumption, saving and health care expenditures for a paternalistic social planner. We 
compare those taxes in the two specifications. We show under which circumstances the first 
best outcome can be decentralized and we study the second best taxes when saving is 
unobservable. 
JEL Code: H21, I18. 
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In our everyday life we consume a number of goods that all bring us utility. For most of
them, that is all. For some, today￿ s consumption can have some e⁄ects on tomorrow￿ s
health. For example, smoking leads to shorter lives or excess sugar to diabetes. To the
extent that we impose costs on ourselves, there is no need for government action except
if out of ignorance or myopia we do not take into account the delayed damage done to
our health.1 If this is the case, then there is a ￿paternalistic￿mandate for public action,
assuming that the government has a correct perception of the health damage generated
by our sinful consumption.
Optimal sin taxes have been studied by O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006). They
model an economy where individuals have hyperbolic preferences and di⁄er in both
their taste for the sin good and in their degree of time-inconsistency. They show how
(heterogeneity in) time inconsistency a⁄ects the optimal (Ramsey) consumption tax
policy. Their main insight is that, ￿although taxes create consumption distortion for
fully self-controlled people, such distortions are second-order relative to the bene￿ts
from reducing over-consumption by people with self-control problems￿ (O￿ Donoghue
and Rabin, 2006, p. 1827). Gruber and Koszegi (2001) study a Pigouvian tax used
to counteract over-consumption due to self-control problems, and apply their model to
the determination of optimal cigarette taxes. Gruber and Koszegi (2004) also study
cigarette taxation with self-control problems, but their focus is the tax incidence for
di⁄erent income groups rather than optimal taxes.
O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006) are representative of the literature studying
present-biased preferences (such as Laibson (1997)) in that 1) they assume that all
non-biased individuals disapprove or regret their past consumption decisions and 2)
there is nothing that agents can do to mitigate the current impact of past consumption
decisions. Our objective in this paper is to lift those two assumptions and study their
consequences on optimal sin taxes.
We model a two-period situation where individuals consume a sin good, with positive
1We are not concerned here by two important issues: addiction and externalities associated with
sinful activities.
1immediate grati￿cation but negative impact on second stage health status. In the second
stage, individuals may invest in health care services that have a positive impact on their
health status. Individuals di⁄er in income and in how much they take into account the
link between sin good consumption and health care on the one hand, and health status
on the other hand.
We contrast two possibilities. In the ￿rst one, individuals realize in the second
period the mistake they did previously, regret their past high sin good consumption,
and invest in health care understanding its correct impact on their health and utility.
In other words, individuals su⁄er from myopia in the ￿rst period, but use their true or
correct preferences later on. They thus exhibit ￿dual selves￿ , using a term coined in
the behavioral literature. A second possibility is that these individuals never take into
account the true impact of sin good consumption and health expenditures on health
status. They thus act upon the same (mistaken) preferences in the two periods of their
lives. Up to their last days, these people stay ignorant of (or unwilling to act upon)
these e⁄ects.
Which preferences should the social planner use when assessing optimal taxes/subsi-
dies on sin good consumption, saving and health care expenditures? The recent liter-
ature on paternalism has studied the impact of the introduction of behavioral consid-
erations on the objective of the planner. Thaler and Sunstein (2003) make a strong
case for ￿libertarian paternalism￿ , which applies to settings in which no coercion is
involved, such as when the planner has to choose the default option (such as the auto-
matic enrollment in 401(k) employee savings plans in the US). Other papers go further
and study situations where the planner￿ s decision coerces people, such as when it taxes
certain goods or even prevents them from being consumed. The literature has focused
upon the case where people di⁄er in their degree of non-rationality. These contribu-
tions advocate the use by the planner of ￿cautious￿(O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (1999))
or ￿asymmetric￿(Camerer et al. (2003)) paternalism, which trades-o⁄ the bene￿ts of
paternalistic interventions for people making mistakes against the costs for fully rational
individuals. This literature usually shows that some intervention is called for by this
kind of paternalism, since deviations from laissez-faire impose second-order costs on
2rational individuals, but ￿rst-order gains for non-rational people. Moreover, they show
(O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006)) that even a small probability (or proportion) of
people making mistakes can have dramatic e⁄ects for optimal policy.
We add to this literature by departing from it in two ways. First, we study the
consequences of adopting a paternalistic objective when individuals are adamant in the
mistakes they make ￿i.e., when they never realize (because for instance of ignorance or
cognitive dissonance) that they base their decisions on wrong premises. Second, rather
than mixing rational and non-rational individuals, we contrast the results obtained
when all individuals are repentant in the second period or when none is (in the two
cases, we allow for heterogeneity in the degree of myopia, but not for whether myopia
persists or not in the second stage). Obviously, paternalism is easier to defend in our
setting when individuals have dual selves. We nevertheless think that a case can be
made in favor of paternalism even when individuals never realize their mistake and thus
always use preferences di⁄erent from those used by the planner. Our approach in that
case is reminiscent of the older literature on ￿merit goods￿ (Musgrave (1959), more
recently Besley (1988)), where we add that the reason for the di⁄erence between the
planner￿ s and the individuals￿preferences resides in the (unrecognized) mistakes made
by individuals. We consider it interesting to study and contrast the results obtained in
the two scenarios even if the argument for paternalism is less convincing in the latter
one.2
We obtain the following results. We ￿rst show that the ￿rst best outcome can be
decentralized with individualized linear taxes and subsidies in the two scenarios (persis-
tent error and dual self). In the ￿rst one, it is necessary to tax the sin good consumption
while subsidizing health care expenditures. There is no need to in￿ uence saving. The
second scenario is more complex, since the social planner faces a problem with changing
preferences. The planner has to intervene in the ￿rst period by taxing the sin good
while subsidizing savings. There is no need to in￿ uence health care expenditures, which
are optimally chosen provided that ￿rst period choices are optimal. Comparing the sin
2To be complete, in the conclusion we discuss what would happen if we adopt a welfarist approach
in the case of persistent myopia/ignorance.
3tax in the two scenarios, we obtain that it is smaller in the dual self case if and only if
the marginal e⁄ect of health care on health status increases with sin good consumption.
We then turn to the second best setting where the planner observes neither income,
preferences nor savings. In the single self case, optimal linear sin taxes and health
expenditure subsidies depend upon two terms: a (classical) covariance term re￿ ecting
distributive considerations and a ￿Pigouvian￿term that re￿ ects the ￿internalities￿an
individual imposes on himself. In the dual self case, optimal tax formulas contain a
third term, which is linked to the inability to control savings. This additional term
calls for higher tax on sin good/subsidies on health care provided that this tax/subsidy
encourages savings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the model, the ￿rst-best
solutions and the decentralization conditions are presented for the two speci￿cations.
Then in section 3 we turn to the second-best problem when individuals persist in their
ignorance. In section 4, we study the alternative second-best problem, that is when
individuals realize having made a mistake. A ￿nal section concludes.
2 First-best and decentralization
2.1 Model
We consider a society consisting of a number of types of individuals i. Each type is
characterized by a wealth endowment wi and a subjective and objective health para-
meter ￿i and ￿i. Each individual￿ s life spans over two periods. In the ￿rst one, he
consumes a numeraire good ci and a sin good xi. He also saves si for future expenses.
In the second period, he consumes an amount di of the numeraire and he invests ei
in health improvement. In this second period, he enjoys a quality of health ￿ih(xi;ei),
on which xi has a negative e⁄ect and ei a positive e⁄ect. For reason of ignorance or
myopia, the individual has a perception of this function that underestimates the impact
of both arguments. In other words, he perceives a health function equal to ￿ih(xi;ei)
with ￿i < ￿i:3
3An alternative speci￿cation could be h(￿ixi;ei) or h(￿ixi;ei), in which case myopia only concerns
the sin good and not health care. This would not change the qualitative nature of our results.
4His two-period utility function can be written as:
Ui = u(ci) + ’(xi) + u(di) + ￿ih(xi;ei); (1)
with budget constraints:
wi = (1 + ￿)si + (1 + ￿)xi + ci ￿ a;
di = si ￿ (1 + ￿)ei;
where ￿;￿;￿ are tax rates and a is a demogrant. For simplicity reasons, we assume a
zero time discount rate and a zero rate of interest.
2.2 First-best
We assume that the government is a paternalistic utilitarian. In other words, it adopts
an objective made of the sum of utilities (1) in which ￿i replaces ￿i: As a benchmark,
we derive the ￿rst-best (FB) conditions by solving the following Lagrangian:
L1 =
X
ni [u(ci) + ’(xi) + u(di) + ￿ih(xi;ei)
￿￿(ci + xi + di + ei ￿ wi)];
where ￿ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the resource constraints and ni
the relative number of type i￿ s individuals. The FOCs yield:
u0 (ci) = u0 (di) = ’0 (xi) + ￿ihx (xi;ei) = ￿ihe (xi;ei) = ￿;








i, the (implicit) individual savings at the ￿rst-best solution.
The utilitarian planner equalizes marginal utility of consuming the numeraire good
in both periods. Since preferences for this good are the same for all individuals, this
calls for c￿
i and d￿
i to be equal and the same for all. Marginal utility for numeraire
and sin goods are also equalized, with the latter composed of the immediate marginal
grati￿cation and of the (true) delayed marginal impact on health. Finally, the planner
also equalizes second period marginal utility from consuming the sin good and from
5consuming health care. If the marginal impact of sin good consumption on health is the
same for all individuals (￿i = ￿), then x￿
i and e￿
i are also identical for all.
It is interesting to contrast these conditions with the laissez-faire (LF) ones, which
are obtained by maximizing:
Ui = u(wi ￿ (1 + ￿)si ￿ (1 + ￿)xi + ai)
+’(xi) + ￿ih(xi;ei) + u(si ￿ (1 + ￿)ei):
In the LF, ￿ = ￿ = ￿ = ai = 0 and we have:
u0 (ci) = u0 (di) = ’0 (xi) + ￿ihx (xi;ei) = ￿ihe (xi;ei):
Marginal utility of consuming the numeraire and the sin goods are also equalized (though
they di⁄er across agents if there is heterogeneity in ￿i), but not at the correct level since
individuals make a mistake when assessing the impact of both sin good and health care
consumption on their second period utility (health status).
2.3 Decentralization with persisting errors
To decentralize the above optimum, we need individualized redistributive lump sum
taxes ai and individualized corrective taxes or subsidies on the sin good and health
expenditure.
￿i =












The tax on sin good consumption forces the individual to internalize the full impact
of his sin good consumption on his health. It is proportional to the share of the impact
that he does not spontaneously internalize (given by the di⁄erence between ￿ and ￿),
to the marginal impact of sin good on health, and decreases with the marginal impact
of health care on health status. It is also necessary to subsidize health care, since
individuals underestimate its impact on health. Intuitively, the subsidy rate is equal
to the percentage of underestimation by the individual (￿ ￿ ￿)=￿. There is no need to
in￿ uence saving, since individuals do not exhibit time-inconsistent preferences.
6Those taxes and subsidies are individualized. Naturally, with ￿i = ￿ and ￿i = ￿,
they would be identical for all.
2.4 Decentralization with dual self
Up to now we have assumed that individuals stick to their beliefs in the second period.
Let us now make the reasonable assumption that in the second period they realize that
they have made a mistake out of ignorance or myopia and will accordingly modify their
decision concerning health care. In behavioral economics, one then speaks of dual self.
When the ￿reasonable￿self prevails in the second period, the choice of ei is deter-
mined by the equality
(1 + ￿)u0 (si ￿ (1 + ￿)ei) = ￿ihe (xi;ei): (4)
On the other hand, this level of e is not the one that the individual envisioned when he
chose his sin good consumption and saving in the ￿rst period. Rather, the amount of
health care that the individual planned to buy later on, denoted by eP
i , is given by
(1 + ￿)u0(si ￿ (1 + ￿)eP
i ) = ￿ihe(xi;eP
i ): (5)
The choice of xi and si then satis￿es the following ￿rst-order conditions:
￿ (1 + ￿i)u0(ci) + u0(si ￿ eP
i ) = 0;






Is it possible to decentralize the ￿rst-best optimum in these conditions with our
linear instruments that are chosen in the ￿rst period? In fact, this is possible using
￿i and ￿i plus ai. With these instruments, and denoting optimal values with a ￿, one
obtains x￿
i and s￿
i, which then imply e￿
i. De￿ning eP￿
i as the planned level of ei when


































7Equation (4) shows that the individual will take the optimal health care decision in the
second stage, provided that he chose the optimal values of x and s in the ￿rst stage.
In￿ uencing health care decision is then unnecessary, provided that tax instruments
on saving and sin good consumption decentralize these two optimal choices. The sin
tax is proportional to the mistake made by the individual. This mistake comes from
two sources: under-estimation of the impact of sin good on health (since ￿ < ￿) and
misplanning of the future amount of health care consumed (eP
i v ei). Since individuals
misplan their future health care need, it is also necessary to in￿ uence their saving
decision, as shown by (6). Note that assuming ￿i = ￿ and ￿i = ￿, we obtain ￿i = ￿
and ￿i = ￿: In words, ai makes everyone identical and the Pigouvian tax and subsidy
rates are identical.
To illustrate this point, assume a single individual with ￿ = 0 < ￿ = 1: We then
have eP￿









2.5 Comparison of sin taxes in the two speci￿cations
It is interesting to compare the sin taxes obtained under the two speci￿cations. To make
the comparison easier, we assume that ￿i = ￿ > 0 and ￿i = ￿. We thus have (with S
for single self and D for dual self):
￿S =













In the two cases, the sin tax is proportional to the error made in the ￿rst stage when
evaluating the damage of sin good consumption on health, measured at the optimal sin
good and health care consumptions. An additional term is present in the dual self case,
which is proportional to the second mistake made by the individual in that case. Since
this individual misestimates how much health care he will buy at the optimum, he is also
8mistaken in his assessment of the marginal damage done by the optimal amount of sin
good consumption, as measured by the function h(x;e). The sign of this impact depends
on the cross-derivative of this function. Assume for instance that it is positive. Since
the individual under-estimates how much health care he will buy, he then over-estimates
how bad the marginal impact of sin good will be (as measured by the function h(:)).
This calls for decreasing the tax on sin good, compared to a ￿single self￿individual.
Assuming that hxe has everywhere the same sign, we then obtain that
￿S T ￿D if and only if hxe T 0:
The sign of this cross derivative depends upon the kind of sin good we are consid-
ering. For instance, it seems reasonable to assume that it is positive if the sin good
is sugar: the more you eat, the more medications designed to treat diabetes may be
helpful to you. With this assumption the sin tax is smaller when the individual ac-
knowledges his mistake in the second period of his life. The opposite assumption can be
make for smoking: heavy smokers increase their probability of getting lung cancer, for
which there is up to now no e¢ cient cure in the majority of cases. Put bluntly, there is
not much utility that you can get from consuming health care if you end up with lung
cancer following heavy smoking...
3 Second-best in the case of persistent errors
We now turn to the second-best setting with linear tax instruments and uniform de-
mogrant. We assume in the remaining of this paper that ￿i = ￿ > ￿i: In other words,
the objective e⁄ect of both e and x on health is the same for all, but individuals vary in
their degree of myopia (as well as in income). We also assume that taxes/subsidies on
saving are not available anymore (either because saving is not observable, or because
elements not modelled, like international mobility of capital, prevent saving from being
taxed or subsidized).
We ￿rst consider the case when the individuals never acknowledge that the true
health parameter is ￿. In that case, restricting the instruments to linear taxes and
9uniform demogrant we write the new Lagrangian as:
L2 =
X
ni [u(wi ￿ si(1 + ￿) ￿ xi (1 + ￿) + a) + ’(xi) + u(si ￿ (1 + ￿)ei)
+￿h(xi;ei) ￿ ￿(a ￿ ￿si ￿ ￿xi ￿ ￿ei)];
where si, xi and ei are functions of a, ￿, ￿ and ￿ and are obtained from the following
optimal conditions for individual choices:
￿ u0 (c)(1 + ￿) + u0 (d) = 0 (9)
￿ u0 (c)(1 + ￿) + ’0 (x) + ￿hx (x;e) = 0 (10)
￿ u0 (d)(1 + ￿) + ￿he (x;e) = 0: (11)
Assuming interior solutions, the FOCs of the social problem are given by:
@L2
@a


































































































In these expressions, we have used the operator E for
P
ni.
10In compensated terms, these expressions can be written as:4
@ ~ L2
@￿









































































It is important to note that we here use the concept of average compensation and



























In Appendix A we provide the FOC￿ s in term of the standard Slutsky e⁄ects. Our
approach is simple, but the signs of the compensated terms have to be interpreted with
caution. For example, we know that @^ x=@￿ < 0, but if x is much smaller than the
average, Ex, @~ x=@￿ could be positive.
In interpreting the above FOCs, we assume that these compensated derivative are
negative. We also observe that with either identical individuals or individualized lump





























11at the beginning of the section, we assume that taxation/subsidization of saving is not








￿ E (￿ ￿ ￿)H￿E
@~ e
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￿ E (￿ ￿ ￿)H￿E
@~ x
@￿






























If we assume that the cross derivatives are negligible, namely that @~ x=@￿ ! 0 and
@~ e=@￿ ! 0, we obtain:
￿ =

















where ￿ > 0:
The ￿rst term of the numerator of (12) and (13) is the Pigouvian term found in
(2) and (3) summed over all individuals with weights equal to the e⁄ect of the tax
on individual demands of either x or e. With both derivatives of demand functions
negative, this term calls for a tax on sin good and a subsidy on health care. The second
term of the numerator of (12) and (13) re￿ ects redistributive considerations. It depends
on the concavity of u, the initial inequality of earnings and the correlation between ￿i
and wi: With identical individuals, this term disappears and (12) and (13) reduce to (2)
and (3). With di⁄erent individuals and no correlation between ￿i and wi, the covariance
will be negative in both equations, since richer people consume more of all goods (x, c
and e) than poorer people with the same degree of myopia. This tends to increase the
tax on sin goods and decrease the subsidy on health care, compared to the case with
identical individuals. With a positive correlation, cov(u0 (c);x) will tend to increase
12(since less myopic people, those with a larger ￿, consume less sin good) which leads to
a smaller sin tax than with zero correlation. The impact of a positive correlation on
cov(u0 (c);e) is less clear: smarter people buy less sin good, but they also better realize
the importance of health care, so that the net impact on the amount of e consumed is
not easy to determine.
4 Second-best with dual self
Now we assume that the individuals realize after one period that they made a mistake
and that the only corrective decision they can make is the choice of health expenditure.
As in section 2.4, we thus distinguish between the planned investment ePand the ex
post choice e. The indirect utility function used by the social planner in its welfare
maximization has to take into account these two values of e which yield two values of d.
In the ￿rst period, the functions x(￿;￿;￿;a), s(￿;￿;￿;a) and eP (￿;￿;￿;a) are ob-
tained as the solution to:
￿ u0 (c)(1 + ￿) + u0 ￿
dP￿
= 0; (14)










where dP = s ￿ eP (1 + ￿) > d = s ￿ e(1 + ￿).





The Lagrangian is given by:
L3 =
X
ni [u(wi ￿ si(1 + ￿) ￿ xi (1 + ￿) + a) + ’(xi) + u(si ￿ (1 + ￿)ei)
+￿h(xi;ei) ￿ ￿(a ￿ ￿si ￿ ￿xi ￿ ￿ei)];
which is similar to L2 except that individual choices are now determined by (14), (15)
13and (17). The FOCs are given by
@L3
@a
=Eu0 (c) + E
￿
























= ￿ Eu0 (c)s + E
￿
























= ￿ Eu0 (c)x + E
￿
























= ￿ Eu0 (s ￿ e(1 + ￿))e + E
￿






















As in the previous section, we assume ￿ = 0 and use @L3=@a to obtain the compen-























































It is clear from the above that even with identical individuals, one cannot achieve the
























































































~ H = ￿hx (x;e) ￿ ￿hx
￿
x;eP￿













14These can be rewritten as follows if we assume that the cross price e⁄ects are negligible:
￿ =
￿cov(u0 (c);x) + E
￿














￿cov(u0 (c);e) + E
￿







The covariance terms in both equations are identical to those in the single self scenario
and re￿ ect the equity concern of public policy. The third term of the numerator of (18)
is the Pigouvian term found in equation (7) summed over all individuals with weights
equal to the e⁄ect of the tax on individual demands of x. With ￿ = 0 or hxe < 0, it
is de￿nitively positive (since @~ x=@￿ < 0). The second term of the numerator of both
equations has the sign of either @~ s=@￿ or @~ s=@￿. The intuition for this term goes as
follows: individuals over-estimate their second period consumption (dP > d) since they
under-estimate their health care needs. As a consequence, they do not save enough. If
either tax has a positive e⁄ect on saving, then it should have a relatively higher value.




























The second part of the sin tax is the familiar Pigouvian term, expressed as in the ￿rst-
best decentralization equation (8). The other term in both equations comes from our
inability to control saving directly, which would be necessary to decentralize the ￿rst-
best optimum. Saving can be indirectly controlled through the use of both ￿ and ￿. If
any of these instruments stimulate saving, this makes using it more desirable.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the case of sin goods that have delayed negative e⁄ects
that individuals ignore at the time of consumption but acknowledge later. Individuals
15have then the possibility of partially compensating those negative e⁄ects by investing in
health care. Assuming a paternalistic government, we show that the ￿rst-best could be
decentralized with a sin tax, a subsidy on saving and individualized lump sum transfers
(or alternatively, by assuming identical individuals). In the second-best, individualized
lump sum transfers are not available and the only available instruments are a linear sin
tax and a linear subsidy on health care. We discuss the optimal second-best tax subsidy
policy wherein distributive and corrective Pigouvian considerations are mixed.
We also consider the case of what we call persistent error, namely the case where in-
dividuals acknowledge the negative e⁄ects of their sinful consumption when it is too late
to take any corrective action (i.e., after ei has been chosen). From an individuals per-
spective this latter case is formally equivalent to yet another setting which corresponds
to what can be called persisting ignorance, where the individual never acknowledges the
negative e⁄ects of his consumption. However, under this interpretation, the use of a
paternalistic approach become questionable; we return to the traditional, ￿old￿pater-
nalism. One could thus argue that the right approach is welfarist and not paternalist
in that setting. We present the welfarist solution to the case of persisting ignorance in
Appendix B. Comparing this to the results obtain in Section 2.3., we show that with
paternalism the planner wants the good of people against their own will not only in
the ￿rst, but also in the second period of their life. With welfarism, we add di⁄erent
utilities, which is also questionable.
In this paper we have focused on sinful consumption. Our method could be used for
other problems. For example, lack of physical exercises or hygiene in the ￿rst period of
life which has delayed detrimental e⁄ects. These e⁄ects can be partially o⁄set in the
second period. Another example is overtime or moonlighting that lead to early disability.
A fully rational individual would understand the importance of not abusing one￿ s body
when young to avoid regretful consequences later on in lifetime. The ingredients of these
various situations are: behavior with delayed detrimental e⁄ects, myopia and possibility
of partial compensation.
16Appendix
A Expressions with standard Slutsky terms
We only consider the case of persistent errors:
L2 =
X
ni [u(wi ￿ si (1 + ￿) ￿ xi (1 + ￿) + a) + ’(xi) + u(si ￿ (1 + ￿)ei)
￿￿(a ￿ ￿si ￿ ￿xi ￿ ￿ei)]:
The FOCs are given by
@L2
@a












































































































































































we can rewrite ￿￿ and ￿￿ as
￿￿ = E (￿ ￿ ￿) ^ H￿ + cov
￿
(￿ ￿ ￿) ^ H￿;x
￿
;
￿￿ = E (￿ ￿ ￿) ^ H￿ + cov
￿




















cov(u0 (c);x)E @^ e


















cov(u0 (c);e)E @^ x























E (￿ ￿ ￿) ^ H￿ + cov
￿










E (￿ ￿ ￿) ^ H￿ + cov
￿





B Welfarist solution in the case of persistent ignorance
In that case the ￿rst-best problem of the social planner can be expressed as
L5 =
X
ni [u(ci) + ’(xi) + u(di) + ￿ih(xi;ei)]
￿￿(ci + xi + di + ei ￿ wi)
and the FOC￿ s are simply
u0 (ci) = u0 (di) = ’0 (xi) + ￿ih(xi;ci)
= ￿ihe (xi;ci) = ￿:
To achieve such an optimum, one does not need any Pigouvian instrument. Lump
sum individualized transfers su¢ ce. The redistribution goes for sure from high income
to low income agents. As to the other characteristic ￿i it is not clear whether the more
myopic bene￿t from redistribution. Individuals with low ￿i tend to consume more xi
but less ei than individuals with high ￿i. Without further assumption, it is di¢ cult to
know the direction of redistribution.








u0 (c1) = u0 (d1) = ’0 (x1); e1 = 0:









If ￿ is very small, type 2 will bene￿t from redistribution; if ￿ is high (strong sin e⁄ect),
type 1 will bene￿t from redistribution.
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